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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XXI DECEMBER, 1935 No. 1
RETROSPECTIVE TAX LAWS
BY RALPH R. NEUHOFF
It is the purpose of this article to consider the cases in which
the Supreme Court of the United States has either upheld or
overthrown tax laws having retrospective operation and to de-
duce if possible a theory on which the various cases can be recon-
ciled. At first glance it would appear that there is no such
principle, and that on the contrary some of the decisions are
contradictory to others. For example, it has been held that a
gift tax cannot be retroactively applied to a gift inter vivos made
after the enactment of a gift tax law was practically assured
by the submission of a conference report thereon to Congress,"
and yet, it has also been held Congress has power to make an
income tax act applicable to income of a year already closed.2
The Constitutions of some states in terms forbid retrospective
laws. For example, the Constitution of Missouri provides that no
law "retrospective in its operation" can be passed by the General
Assembly3 This provision has been held to apply to revenue
laws,4 and is the reason why Missouri cannot make an income tax
law retroactive for even part of a year.
The only provisions in the Federal Constitution specifically
referring to retroactivity are those forbidding ex post facto
laws., However, these have been construed to apply only to
criminal and penal laws,6 and accordingly, are not applicable to
revenue laws.
1 Untermeyer v. Anderson (1928) 276 U. S. 440, 72 L. Ed. 645.
2 Stockdale v. Atlantic Ins. Co. (1874) 20 Wall. 323; 22 L. Ed. 348.
2 (1875) Art. II, Sec. 15.
4 Smith v. Dirckx (1920) 283 Mo. 188, 223 S. W. 104, 11 A. L. R. 510.5 Art. I, Sec. 9 and Art. I, Sec. 10.6 Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky (1911) 219 U. S. 140.
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However, the States and the United States are forbidden to
take property "without due process of law."' The Fifth Amend-
ment also has a provision against taking private property "for
public use without just compensation" which does not appear in
the Fourteenth Amendment; but inasmuch as taking private
property for public use without just compensation would not be
"due process of law" it is believed that the problem is the same
under both Amendments.8
So in practice the question of the validity of a retrospective
Federal or state tax law (so far as affected by any provision
of the Federal Constitution) may be reduced to the simple ques-
tion of whether it operates to deprive the taxpayer of his prop-
erty without due process of law.
Turning to the cases which have been decided, we find that in
a number of decisions the particular instance of retroactive
application has been held to be due process of law, and in a
number of others it has been held to present a want of due
process.
After some thought, the writer has concluded that if these
decisions can be harmonized by a single doctrine it would prob-
ably be as follows: Retroactive application of a tax law is per-
mitted only where it would not operate unfairly by attaching
consequences to an act by a taxpayer which he could not reason-
ably have foreseen. If it should be urged that this is not far
removed from saying that "retrospective tax laws are permitted
only where they do not operate unfairly," the writer will at once
admit the charge. It is believed, however, that the portion of the
doctrine with respect to attaching unforeseen consequences is of
some practical value and at all events considerable cognitation
has not evolved any better test.
Let us proceed therefore to consider the decided cases in the
light of the principle above propounded.
The case of Blodgett v. Holden9 involved the validity of the gift
tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1924. The facts were that
gifts were made on January 2, 1924, and that the gift tax pro-
visions of the Revenue Act of 1924, under which the government
7Fourteenth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, U. S. Const.
8 Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley (1896) 164 U. S. 112; Green
v. Frazier (1920) 253 U. S. 233.
9 (1927) 275 U. S. 142.
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proposed to tax the gifts, did not come before Congress prior to
February 25, 1924. The Court treats the case as presenting the
question of the validity of the tax on a gift fully consummated
before the gift tax provisions came before Congress.
The language of the principal opinion shows the train of rea-
soning of the Court:
"As to the gifts which Blodgett made during January, 1924,
we think the challenged enactment is arbitrary and for that
reason invalid. It seems wholly unreasonable that one who, in
entire good faith and without the slightest premonition of such
consequences, made absolute disposition of his property by gifts
should therefore be required to pay a charge for so doing."9"
It would appear therefore that Blodgett v. Holden is consistent
with the hypothesis above propounded because a taxpayer could
not have "reasonably foreseen" something of which he did not
have the "slightest premonition."
But in Untermyer v. Anderson, ° above referred to, the donor
of the gift proposed to be taxed could not plead ignorance of the
probable consequences of his gift. The gift was made on May
23, 1924, some three months after the gift tax provisions were
presented for the consideration of Congress and while the con-
ference report on the bill was pending. This report had gone to
the Senate on May 22, 1924 and three days thereafter the bill
had finally passed both houses. The bill was signed by the Presi-
dent and became a law on June 2, 1924, which, it will be observed,
was only ten days after the gift was made. It would appear that
this taxpayer had much more than a "premonition" of a tax when
he made his gifts. Nevertheless, the tax was held invalid as
applied "to bona fide gifts not made in anticipation of death and
fully consummated prior to June 2, 1924."
The fact that the gift was made while the taxing act was in
the last stage of progress through Congress was referred to and
held immaterial on the ground that any other view would pre-
sent insuperable operating difficulties.
The Court considers that the future of every bill before Con-
gress is necessarily uncertain and that a taxpayer ought not be
required to guess the outcome of a pending measure.
' Italics supplied.
10 Supra, note 1.
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The element of unfairness in applying the tax retroactively to
gifts of the class of Untermyer v. Anderson is largely created
by a process of argument, viz. it would be unfair to tax gifts
made so long before the enactment of the tax law that the donor
could not in fact have reasonably anticipated a tax when he made
the gift and for reasons of convenience of administration all
gifts made before the actual passage of the tax law are grouped
in the exempt class because it is too hard to distinguish between
various degrees of warning which a donor may have received
as the law progressed through Congress. It will not do to say
that the taxpayer is entitled to definitely know the amount of
the tax which will be entailed by a particular act, and that it
would be "unfair" otherwise, because this would apply to a
retroactive change of rate on a transaction which is taxable at
some rate when entered into. As will be seen below, this class
of retrospective law is permissible.11
With the foregoing qualifications, we can classify Untermeyer
v. Anderson as consistent with the "unfairness" hypotheses.
We have been considering the Federal tax on gifts as such.
Let us now consider gifts which are included in the gross estate
of a decedent for purposes of an estate or inheritance tax.
Nichols v. Coolidge12 was decided on the theory that a convey-
ance in fee reserving a life estate in the donor was "a convey-
ance intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death."13 The transfers in question had been made in 1907
at which time there was no Federal Estate tax law in effect.
Thereafter the Revenue Act of February 24, 1919 was passed
which included in the gross estate (among other things) the
value at the death of decedent of all property "to the extent of
any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer, or with respect to which he has at any time created
a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in posses-
sion or enjoyment at or after his death (whether such transfer
11 Milliken v. U. S. (1927) 274 U. S. 531, infra.
12 Supra, note 11.
is Apparently the United States Supreme Court would not now consider
such transfers as intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death. See Burnet v. Northern Trust Co. (1931) 283 U. S. 782
affirming (1930) 41 Fed. (2d) 732 per curiam on the authority of May v.
Heiner (1930) 281 U. S. 238.
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or trust is made or created before or after the passage of this
act) except in case of a bona fide sale for a fair consideration
in money or money's worth."
The Court held that the statute under consideration as applied
to the transfers in 1907 "is arbitrary, capricious and amounts to
confiscation." Since the donor in 1907 could not have reasonably
anticipated the tax attempted to be imposed, it is believed that
the case of Nichols v. Coolidge is consistent with the theory that
Court will not permit retroactive application of a tax where it
would attach consequences after the gift was in good faith com-
pleted which the donor could not reasonably have anticipated.
The transfers under discussion in Nichols v. Coolidge were
also considered in Coolidge v. Long14 in which retrospective
application of the Massachusetts inheritance tax was considered.
The question was whether such application to remainders already
vested before the passage of the act was repugnant to due process
of law under the Fourteenth Amendment and the contract clause
of the Constitution, and it was held that it was.
Mr. Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that the Court
had repeatedly approved the selection of the event of possession
and enjoyment as the proper occasion for the imposition of an
excise and as this event took place after the passage of the taxing
act, it was not subject to the vice of retroactivity. Upon analysis,
however, it would appear that this does not avoid the "fairness"
principle above set out for the reason that once the irrevocable
trust had been created, the grantor no longer had any opportu-
nity to avoid the shifting of possession at a later date. To use a
phrase from the opinion in another case, 15 the tax operates "to
impose an unexpected liability that, if known, might have in-
duced those concerned to avoid it, and to use their money in
other ways."
An example of a retroactive tax law which was upheld is
found in Milliken v. United States.16 This case involved the
Federal Estate tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 1918. Gifts
had been made by decedent in December 1916 while the Revenue
Act of 1916 was in effect and they were admittedly made "in
14 (1931) 282 U. S. 582.
16 Lewellyn v. Frick (1925) 268 U. S. 238.
Is (1931) 283 U. S. 15.
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contemplation of death" so as to require their inclusion in the
gross estate of a decedent if decedent had died while the Act of
1916 was in effect. The rates applied by the Revenue Act of
1918 were higher than those of the 1916 Act, and it was urged
that it was a violation of the due process clause to apply these
higher rates to gifts completed before the effective date of the
Revenue Act of 1918. It was further urged that it was objection-
able to require the inclusion in an estate taxable under the 1918
Act of gifts completed before its date of enactment-regardless
of the question of increased rates.
However, the Court held that the retroactive application was
due process of law in both particulars.
The Court refers to the fact that gifts in contemplation of
death "are motivated by the same considerations as lead to
testamentary dispositions of property." From this it follows that
the decedent should "expect" such a gift to be included in his
gross estate when he dies, since the policy of requiring such in-
clusion had already been adopted in the Revenue Act of 1916 in
force at the date of the gifts.
While the "fairness" principle is not stated in so many words,
it is clearly hinted at in the following language of the court :1
"Not only was the decedent left in no uncertainty that the gift
he was then making was subject to the provisions of the existing
statute, but in view of its well understood purpose he should be
regarded as taking his chances of any "increase in the tax
burden which might result from carrying out the established
policy of taxation under which substitutes for testamentary gifts
were classed and taxed with them." (Italics supplied.)
In other words, since the decedent had ample warning that he
was making a transactioii of a character that could be subjected
to estate tax and must have known that the rates in tax laws
were subject to change, it was "fair" that the gifts previously
made in contemplation of death should be included in the de-
cedent's estate and taxed at whatever rates happened to be in
effect when he died.
We meet with an analogous situation in the case of an in-
heritance tax on property conveyed by decedent in his lifetime by
17 Supra, note 16, 1. c. 23.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss1/1
RETROSPECTIVE TAX LAWS
a revocable trust. Saltonstall v. Saltonstal118 dealt with such a
situation.
Between 1905 and 1907 one Brooks transferred certain prop-
erty to trustees for the benefit of himself and wife during their
lives, and then for their children. The trust instrument provided
that its terms might be changed and the trust terminated, in
whole or in part, by Brooks with the concurrence of one trustee.
The power to alter was in fact exercised by Brooks several times
during his lifetime.
When the transfers were made there were no Massachusetts
statutes taxing the transfer to the children under those circum-
stances. Thereafter, in 1909 and in 1916 amendments were en-
acted which were deemed to bring the transfers within the pur-
view of the Massachusetts transfer tax. Brooks died in 1920.
The question was whether, as so interpreted, the statutes oper-
ated to take property without due process of law because they
included interests which had vested prior to the enactment of
the amendments.
In the Court's view, the tax is not retroactive because the
thing taxed is the succession. The Court says ::"
". ... the gift taxed is not long since completed, but one
which never passed to the beneficiaries beyond recall until the
death of the donor; and the value of the gift at that operative
moment, rather than at some later (sic) date is the basis of
the tax."
Of course this reasoning in one sense avoids retroactivity, but
if the statute is deemed retroactive, then it is consistent with
the "fairness" principle because the power of the settlor to re-
voke the trust renders it fair to tax the transfer. While the tax
in this case was on the beneficiaries, it is believed that the rule
would be the same in case of a tax on the power to transmit upon
death as is the case with the Federal Estate Tax, and that the
opportunity which the decedent has in case of a revocable trust
to alter the situation if it is not to his liking renders it permissi-
ble to impose an estate tax on the assets of a revocable trust by
a law enacted at any time before the death of the decedent.
Another example of a retroactive estate tax which is probably
Is (1928) 276 U. S. 260.
19 Supra, note 18, 1. c. 271.
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permissible is the tax on proceeds of life insurance policies taken
out prior to the enactment of the tax where the assured has re-
tained the right to change the beneficiary . This situation was
not directly passed upon in Chase National Bank v. United
States20 for the reason that the policies in question in that case
were taken out in 1922 and the Act under which they were taxed
was passed November 23, 1921. However, the Court plainly
considers that where a decedent retains a legal interest in life
insurance policies which gave him the power of disposition of
them and their proceeds, the taxable transfer occurs at the date
of the decedent's death. If this be so it would be immaterial that
the policies were taken out prior to the passage of the law.
That this is so follows from Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.!1
Here the court was considering certain revocable trusts which
had been created by the decedent in 1903 and 1910 respectively,
prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1921 under which
the assets of the trusts were included in the gross estate of the
decedent for Federal Estate tax. Objection was made that this
was not due process of law because retroactive. The answer of
the Court was that in Chase National Bank v. United States
(supra) decided on the same day, the decision rested upon the
ground "that a transfer made subject to a power of revocation
in the transferror, terminable at his death is not complete until
his death. ' 22
This shows that in cases where the transfer occurs at the
death, when a power to revoke terminates, it is not material
when the revocable situation was created, be it a trust or a life
insurance policy with the retained powers.
The foregoing process of argument was used by the Board of
Tax Appeals in Louis M. Weiller et al. Trustees.2 3
A general power of appointment resembles a revocable trust
in this, that the donee of the power has a right which is tanta-
mount to ownership and accordingly there is nothing "unfair"
in applying a tax to the exercise (or even the non-exercise) of
the power even though the tax is imposed by a law enacted after
the power is vested in the donee of the power.
20 (1929) 278 U. S. 327.
21 (1929) 278 U. S. 339.
22 Supra, note 21, 1. c. 345.
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After the law is enacted, the donee of the power of appoint-
ment still has a chance to exercise his own choice and is not
taken by surprise.
The ruling on exercise of a power of appointment is-found in
Lee v. Commissioner.24
The Federal Government has not attempted to tax the non-
exercise of a general power of appointment so there has been
no occasion for this power to be adjudicated with respect to
either a prospective or retroactive law, but on principle the rul-
ing would probably be the same as on the exercise of the power.
The "fairness" principle met a somewhat more severe test
in connection with the estate tax upon the interest of the decedent
in an estate in joint tenancy created proior to the enactment of
the Federal Estate Tax Act of 1916.
In the case of Gwinn v. Commissioner" the decedent and her
son had acquired certain property in 1915 by equal contributions.
The title was taken as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
The interest of the decedent was subjected to federal estate tax
under the Revenue Act of June 2, 1924. It was urged that it was
arbitrary and a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment to tax the interest which had vested before the en-
actment of the first Federal Estate Tax Act. The Court answers
this contention with the statement that the rights of the possible
survivor were not irrevocably fixed in 1915 when the joint ten-
ancy was created, because the joint estate might have been
terminated by voluntary conveyance by either party, through
proceedings for partition or by an involuntary alienation under
an execution. Therefore the death was held to be the "generating
source" of accessions of property rights that could be taxed by
a law enacted after the joint tenancy was created.
It would be expected that an estate by the entirety would be
in the same situation as an estate in joint tenancy. Griswold v.
Helvering26 presented this question. The estate had been created
28 (1930) 18 B. T. A. 1121. See also to same effect William A. Cushman
et al. Executors (1930) 19 B. T. A. 1012 and Prentice Hall Fed. Tax Service
(1935) Par. 23,201-A.
2* (1932) 57 Fed. (2d) 399. Certiorari denied by Supreme Court of
United States May 31, 1932, 286 U. S. 563.
2 (1932) 287 U. S. 224.
26 (1933) 290 U. S. 56.
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in 1909 and the tax was imposed under the Revenue Act of
November 23, 1921. The Court says that the sole question is
whether the application of the statute gives it a "retroactive
effect."
The Court says:27
"Under the statute the death of decedent is the event in respect
of which the tax is laid. It is the existence of the joint tenancy
at the time, and not its creation at the earlier date, which fur-
nishes the basis for the tax. By the judgment under review, only
half of the value, that is to say, the value of decedent's interest,
has been included, leaving the survivor's interest unaffected.
After the creation of the joint tenancy, and until his death, de-
cedent retained his interest in, and control over, half of the
property. Cessation of that interest and control at death pre-
sented the proper occasion for the imposition of a tax. . . . The
statute as applied does not lay a tax in respect of an event al-
ready past, but in respect of one yet to happen."
It will be seeti that the "fairness" principle is avoided here
because the Court does not treat the statute as retroactive. But
if it is deemed retroactive, the fairness of the tax would seem
to depend upon the power of the tenants by the entirety to alter
their situation after the taxing statute was enacted. This fea-
ture of the case which was stressed by the Court in Gwinn v.
Commissioner8 is ignored here. However, it is certainly true
that the two tenants by the entirety could have altered the situ-
ation by acting collectively and this is probably enough to "save
the day" under the "fairness" principle, namely that the imposi-
tion of the tax after the event must not operate to take the tax-
payer unawares and impose consequences that he could not have
foreseen and might have avoided if forewarned.
When we come to income taxation the Court has viewed the
matter from a somewhat different angle. There is no objection
in the mind of the Court to retroactive income tax laws, at least
where the income is fairly recent. This may be due to the sup-
position that a person will obtain what income he can regardless
of the obligation to pay an income tax on it. Therefore "fair-
ness" does not demand that the taxpayer be given an opportunity
to refrain from earning income because presumably he would
27 Supra, note 26, 1. c. 58.
28 Supra, note 25.
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want the income, regardless. At all events the Supreme Court of
the United States is firmly committed to the doctrine that retro-
activity is no objection to an income tax (at least as applied
to recent income) . 29
The "fairness" principle receives a rather severe test in the
case of Brunet v. Wells.2o In this case an irrevocable trust had
been created for the purpose of paying premiums on insurance
on the life of the donor and the beneficiaries were members of
donor's family. The question was whether the income from the
trust could be included in donor's income for purposes of the
federal income tax. It was held that such income could be so
taxed. The premiums on the insurance were deemed "personal
expenses" of the donor and it was thought not to be unfair to
tax him on the income devoted to their payment, although this
was done by a law passed after the trust was created. It might
be urged that because the donor could no longer change the
situation which he had created before the law was passed, he was
visited with consequences which he could not have foreseen and
that the principle of fairness was violated. A possible answer is
that this is analogous to the gift in contemplation of death
(Milliken v. United States, supra) and the donor had placed him-
self "beyond the pale" by an attempted evasion.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it would appear that the decided cases are
in harmony with the doctrine that a tax can be retroactive only
when it does not thereby attach consequences to an act which the
taxpayer could not reasonably have foreseen, but this doctrine
leaves considerable room for interpretation as to what conse-
quences should have been anticipated by the taxpayer from a
particular act.
29 Stockdale v. Atlantic Ins. Co. (1874) 20 Wall. 323, Brushaber v. Union
Pacific Ry. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1, 1. c. 20. Practically all of the Revenue
Acts have been at least partially retroactive and some have applied to in-
come of years already closed.80 (1933) 289 U. S. 670.
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